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LIABILITY IN TORT OF MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS IN MISSOURI
WALTER FREEDmAN*
A layman would think it incredible that in this modern age of com-
parative technological development and sociological enlightenment the
historic maxim, "the King can do no wrong," should be invoked to exempt
the branches of democratic governments from liability for their torts. The
aphorism stands as an impregnable fortress protecting the immunity of
the municipality, a subordinate agency of the state, against the blast of
criticism which has been directed at the rule-a creation of judicial
empiricism.
It is sophistry to say that "the King can do no wrong." It is obvious
that the municipal corporation is today an active creature, permeating
our existence and shaping our conduct. The municipality in our modern
state orders, prohibits, and protects. Through its agents and servants it
is capable of and does inflict harm. The many cases brought against
municipal corporations for negligence attest to the validity of this truism.
One of this country's great legal scholars has shown the maxim to
be based on a misconception.2  The first American cases exempting a
municipality from liability in tort was founded upon a misinterpretation
of an earlier English case. 4 Despite this error and the manifest injustice
of the rule, judicial utterances continue in doctrinal accord.
*Graduate Fellow, Harvard Law School, A.B. and LL.B., Washington
University.
1. Harno, Tort Immunity of Municipal Corporations (1921) 4 ILL. L. Q. 28;
Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (1924) 34 YALE L. J. 1, 129, 229;
Borchard, Tort Liability of the State (1930) 12 J. COMP. LEG. AND INT. LAW (3d.
series) 1; Tooke, Extension of Municipal Liability in Tort (1932) 19 VA. L. REV.
97; Seasongood, Municipal Corporations: Objections to the Governmental or
Proprietary Test (1936) 22 VA. L. REv. 910; Note, Inroads upon Municipal Im-
munity in Tort (1932) 46 HARV. L. REV. 305.
2. Borchard, supra note 1, 34 YALE L. J., at 2, n. 2; (1926) 36 id. 1, 757,
1039.
3. Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicester, 9 Mass. 247 (1812).
4. Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K. B. 1788). In this case
the defendant was an unincorporated county which possessed no corporate fund.
Any judgment in plaintiff's favor would have had to be satisfied by a few in-
dividuals, the injustice of which is patent. Municipalities and counties, today,
are incorporated and possess funds which may be enlarged, if need be, through
the exercise of the taxing power. (275)
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Mr. Justice Holmes, himself dissatisfied with the basis for the "ob-
solete theory," took occasion to advance an equally unsatisfactory basis.
He placed the exemption upon "the logical and practical ground that
there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law
on which the right depends." 5  The justification of the myth of the non-
suability of the state was exploded by the United States Supreme Court
itself in an earlier case., To say then that the state is sovereign, the city
its governmental agency; that no suit can be brought against the state
without its consent; that, therefore, none can be brought against the
municipality, is to propose a syllogism which has no foundation in fact.
The fallacious nature of the explanation for the rule of non-liability
is best illustrated by instances where the liability of the municipality is
clear and uncontradicted: in contract,' in admiralty law,8 in trespass,"
for maintenance of a nuisance,10 under statutory and constitutional pro-
vision," - et cetera.
In partial recognition of the explanation for the rule of non-liability
the courts have made an inroad into the commands of judicial ritual and
allocated municipal conduct into two classifications. 2 The first is conduct
pursued in the performance of duties arbitrarily imposed by the legis-
lature. In this field the municipality is regarded as a state agency to
which the legislature has delegated a portion of its governmental power
to be exercised in behalf of the state. These functions are labelled "gov-
ernmental" or "public." In the performance of these the municipality
shares the exemption of the sovereign for injuries inflicted by the neg-
ligence of its officers. This immunity is rationalized by demonstrating that
here the municipality derives no profit. Liability in tort, however, is not
5. Holmes, J., in Kawananakoa v. Polybank, 205 U. S. 349, 353 (1907).
Cf. Holmes, J., in The Western Maid, 257 U. S. 419, 432 (1922).
6. Chisholm v. Georgia, 1 U. S. 419 (1793).
7. State ex rel. K. C. Ins. Agts' Ass'n v. Kansas City, 319 Mo. 386, 4 S. W.(2d) 427 (1928); Gould v. City of Illmo, 108 S. W. (2d) 418 (Mo. App. 1937);
6 MCQUILLEN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2d rev. ed. 1937) § 2652, p. 667.
8. Workman v. New York City, 179 U. S. 552 (1900).
9. Dooley v. City of Kansas, 82 Mo. 444 (1884).
10. Newman v. City of Marceline, 222 Mo. App. 980, 6 S. W. (2d) 659 (1928).
11. Mo. CONST. art. 2, § 21 (1875); Aurora Water Co. v. City of Aurora,
129 Mo. 540, 31 S. W. 946 (1895); Belcher Sugar Refining Co. v. St. Louis
Grain Elevator Co., 101 Mo. 192, 13 S. W. 822 (1890) ; Webb City and Carterville
Waterworks Co. v. Webb City, 78 Mo. App. 422 (1899).
12. The first case to announce this distinction was Bailey v. The Mayor of
New York, 3 Hill 531 (N. Y. 1842). See Barnett, The Foundations of the Dis-
tinction between Public and Private Functions in Respect to the Common-Law
Tort Liability of Municipal Corporations (1937) 16 ORE. L. REv. 250.
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dependent upon the actor being engaged in a profit-making venture at
the time the negligent act is committed.13
Another explanation, supported by Missouri adjudications,14 is that
members of municipal departments, in the performance of public duties, are
not agents of the municipality, and, therefore, the doctrine of respondeat
superior does not apply. This reasoning stands opposed to a fundamental
principle of agency law which considers the character of the service per-
formed immaterial, and regards as important the extent of control which
the employer has over the employee in the matter of wages, duration of
employment, manner of execution of the work, and other matters.' 5
To submit, in justification of the rule, that the immunity is necessary
for the proper functioning of the city, is to propound the obvious con-
tradiction that the agency formed to protect society is under no obligation,
when acting itself, to protect an individual member of society.'6
In the other class of functions performed by municipal corporations
are those voluntarily assumed under general statutes and generally re-
garded as being conducted for pecuniary gain or for the special advantage
and benefit of the locality and its inhabitants. These functions are re-
ferred to as "corporate," "ministerial," or "proprietary." In the per-
formance of these duties the municipality is responsible for the negligence
of its agents just as a private person or corporation. This distinction is
recognized in Missouri. It is, in fact, accepted in all the states except
one.'
13. Harno, loc. cit. supra, note 1.
14. Heller v. Sedalia, 53 Mo. 159 (1873) (fireman); Cassidy v. St. Joseph,
247 Mo. 197, 152 S. W. 306, 309 (1912) (street cleaner); Bullmaster v. St.
Joseph, 70 Mo. App. 60, 68 (1897) (employee of city steam plant used to pro-
vide electricity for public buildings); Hawkins v. Springfield, 194 Mo. App. 151,
186 S. W. 576 (1916) (fireman).
15. 2 MECHM, LAW OF AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) § 1863.
16. See Johnson, J., in Fowler v. Cleveland, 100 Ohio St. 158, 126 N. E. 72(1919).
17. Murtaugh v. St. Louis, 44 Mo. 479 (1869); Ulrich v. St. Louis, 112 Mo.
138, 20 % W. 466 (1892); Barree v. Cape Girardeau, 197 Mo. 382, 95 S. W.
330 (1906); same, 132 Mo. App. 182, 112 S. W. 724 (1908); Healy v. Kansas
City, 277 Mo. 619, 211 S. W. 59 (1919); Lober v. Kansas City, 74 S. W. (2d)
815 (Mo. 1934); Whitfield v. Carrollton, 50 Mo. App. 98 (1892); Bullmaster v.
St. Joseph, 70 Mo. App. 60 (1897); D'Arcourt v. Little River Drainage Dist.,
212 Mo. App. 610, 245 S. W. 394 (1922), aff'd, 253 S. W. 966 (Mo. 1923); 6
McQurLLEN, op. cit. supra note 7, at §§ 2771, 2792.
18. 6 McQuILL-N, op. cit. supra note 7, at §§ 2771, 2792. The lone dissent-
ing state is South Carolina: Black v. Columbia, 19 S. C. 412 (1883); Irvine v.
Town of Greenwood, 89 S. C. 511, 72 S. E. 228 (1911). The refusal to recognize
the distinction is commendable, but the conclusion of the South Carolina courts
that in neither case is the municipality liable, is subject to stricture.
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Liability or non-liability, therefore, of a municipal corporation for its
torts depends not upon the nature of the tort or the relation existing be-
tween the city and the injured person, 9 but upon the character of the act
performed. The dichotomy has occasioned much litigation, designed to
categorize various activities upon which the liability or non-liability is con-
tingent.
In the early Missouri case of Murtaugh v. St. Louis,20 Currier, J., said:
"... where the officer or servant of a municipal corporation
is in the exercise of a power conferred upon the corporation for
its private benefit, and injury ensues from the negligence or mis-
feasance of such officer or servant, the corporation is liable, as
in the case of private corporations or parties; but when the acts
or omissions complained of were done or omitted in the exercise
of a corporate franchise conferred upon the corporation for the
public good, and not for private corporate advantage, then the
corporation is not liable for the consequences of such acts or omis-
sions on the part of its officers and servants."
Since this utterance the Missouri appellate courts have found it nec-
essary to determine which functions performed by a municipal corpora-
tion are governmental and which are ministerial. In this process of
adjudication, the courts have designated the following functions as gov-
ernmental: the maintenance of hospitals,2 ' police forces,22 prisons,2" order
in public parks,2 4 courthouses, 25 schools, 26 fire departments, 27 traffic sig-
19. The Florida courts have reached a unique conclusion in deciding that
under a commission form of government cities are liable in tort just as a private
corporation. Tallahassee v. Kaufman, 87 Fla. 119, 100 So. 150 (1924). The
decision was rested on the Ohio case of Fowler v. Cleveland, 100 Ohio St. 158, 126
N. E. 72 (1919). The Ohio case was subsequently overruled in Aldrich v.
Youngstown, 106 Ohio St. 342, 140 N. E. 164 (1922), but the Florida courts have
not receded from their holding: West Palm Beach v. Grimmett, 102 Fla. 680, 137
So. 385 (1931); Wolfe v. Miami, 103 Fla. 774, 137 So. 892 (1931).
20. 44 Mo. 479, 480 (1869). This rule had been advanced in an earlier
case of Soulard v. St. Louis, 36 Mo. 546 (1865), a case in which the city was
held liable for not following the proper condemnation procedure in appropriating
plaintiff's property for the purpose of constructing a street.
21. Murtaugh v. St. Louis, 44 Mo. 479 (1869); Zummo v. Kansas City,
285 Mo. 222, 225 S, W. 934 (1920).
22. Worley v. Columbia, 88 Mo. 106 (1885); McConnell v. St. Charles,
204 S. W. 1075 (Mo. 1918); Pearson v. Kansas City, 331 Mo. 885, 55 S. W.
(2d) 485 (1932); Stater v. Joplin, 189 Mo. App. 383, 176 S. W. 241 (1915);
Connelly v. Sedalia, 2 S. W. (2d) 632 (Mo. App. 1928).
23. Ulrich v. St. Louis, 112 Mo. 138, 20 S. W. 466 (1892).
24. Healy v. Kansas City, 277 Mo. 619, 211 S. W. 59 (1919).
25. Cunningham v. St. Louis, 96 Mo. 53, 8 S. W. 787 (1888).
26. Cochran v. Wilson, 287 Mo. 210, 229 S. W. 1050 (1921); Dick v. Board
of Education of St. Louis, 238 S. W. 1073 (Mo. 1922).
27. Heller v. Sedalia, 53 Mo. 159 (1873); McKenna v. St. Louis, 6 Mo. App.
320 (1878); Hawkins v. Springfield, 194 Mo. App. 151, 186 S. W. 576 (1916).
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nals, 28 safety gates at railroad crossings, 29 dogpounds,3 ° and the collection
of refuse and debris."- The exercise of the power of taxation is undis-
putably the performance of a governmental function.
32
The following activities are held to be exercised by the municipality
in its proprietary capacity: the maintenance of electric light plants,3"
waterworks," sewers,35 bridges,38 streets,37 alleys,38 markets," parks,40
comfort stations"' and sanitary streets.
42
Today, the municipality performs numerous tasks. So blended are
they that segregation along logical lines is impossible.4 3 This conclusion
is perhaps most strikingly illustrated by the following examples: Water
(private) is intimately connected with health (public). It is needed for
28. Auslander v. St. Louis, 332 Mo. 145, 56 S. W. (2d) 778 (1933).
29. Seibert v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 188 Mo. 657, 87 S. W. 995 (1905).
30. Wilks v. Caruthersville, 162 Mo. App. 492, 142 S. W. 800 (1912);
Thomas v. Kennett, 178 S. W. 254 (Mo. App. 1915).
31. Cassidy v. St. Joseph, 247 Mo. 197, 152 S. W. 306 (1912); Behrmann v.
St. Louis, 273 Mo. 578, 201 S. W. 547 (1918); Lober v. Kansas City, 74 S. W.
(2d) 815 (Mo. 1934).
32. Butler v. Moberly, 131 Mo. App. 172, 110 S. W. 682 (1908); Brightwell
v. Kansas City, 153 Mo. App. 519, 134 S. W. 87 (1911).
33. Riley v. Independence, 258 Mo. 671, 167 S. W. 1022 (1914); Thompson
v. Lamar, 322 Mo. 514, 17 S. W. (2d) 960 (1929); Bullmaster v. St. Joseph, 70
Mo. App. 60 (1897) (even though the electricity generated was used to light
public streets and buildings).
34. Dammann v. St. Louis, 152 Mo. 186, 53 S. W. 932 (1899); De Mayo v.
Kansas City, 210 S. W. 380 (Mo. 1919); Public Service Comm. v. Kirkwood, 319
Mo. 562, 4 S. W. (2d) 773 (1928).
35. Windle v. Springfield, 320 Mo. 459, 8 S. W. (2d) 61 (1928); Woods v.
Kansas City, 58 Mo. App. 272 (1894); Hannan v. Kansas City, 187 Mo. App.
315, 173 S. W. 703 (1915); Kinlough v. Maplewood, 201 S. W. 625 (Mo. App.
1918).
36. Jordan v. Hannibal, 87 Mo. 673 (1885); Boyd v. Kansas City, 291 Mo.
622, 237 S. W. 1001 (1922).
37. Wegmann v. Jefferson City, 61 Mo. 55 (1875); Russell v. Columbia, 74
Mo. 480 (1881); Barree v. Cape Girardeau, 197 Mo. 382, 95 S. W. 330 (1906);
same, 132 Mo. App. 182, 112 S. W. 724 (1908); Davoren v. Kansas City, 308 Mo.
513, 273 S. W. 401 (1925); Metz v. Kansas City, 229 Mo. App. 402, 81 S. W.
(2d) 462 (1935).
38. Gerst v. St. Louis, 185 Mo. 191, 84 S. W. 34 (1904); Asbury v. Kansas
City, 161 Mo. App. 496, 144 S. W. 127 (1912).
39. Spalding v. Ziegler, 173 Mo. App. 698, 160 S. W. 14 (1913).
40. Capp v. St. Louis, 251 Mo. 345, 158 S. W. 616 (1913) ; Healy v. Kansas
City, 277 Mo. 619, 211 S. W. 59 (1919) ; Volz v. St. Louis, 326 Mo. 362, 32 S. W.
(2d) 72 (1930); Muser v. Kansas City, 249 S. W. 681 (Mo. App. 1923): Ed-
monston v. Kansas City, 227 Mo. App. 817, 57 S. W. (2d) 690 (1933); Thayer
v. St. Joseph, 227 Mo. App. 623, 54 S. W. (2d) 442 (1932).
41. Kuenzel v. St. Louis, 278 Mo. 277, 212 S. W. 876 (1919).
42. Adams v. Frankford, 251 S. W. 125 (Mo. App. 1923), apparently over-
ruled sub silentio in Lober v. Kansas City, 74 S. W. (2d) 815 (Mo. 1934).
43. "The reasons given for liability and for non-liability of municipal
corporations we admit are not logical or consistent. Some of the reasons given
for non-liability will apply just as forcibly to cases where liability is asserted and
vice versa." Ellison. J., in Young v. Metropolitan Street Rv.. 126 Mo. App. 1, 9,
103 S. W. 135 (1907). See Seasongood, supra note 1, at 917.
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fire protection (public), street cleaning (private and public), and in the
cleaning of schools (public). It serves drinking fountains in public places
(public) and to sprinkle the grass in the parks (private). It is required
in air-conditioning courthouses and hospitals (public). Electricity
(private) is used to control traffic lights (public) and to light city build-
ings (public). Adequate street lighting tends to decrease accidents, there-
by lessening the need for police (public). Sewers (private) and comfort
stations (private) are part of a system of public sanitation (public). The
fire and police departments (public) furnish needed protection to markets
(private).
In utter disregard for this penumbral relationship, the courts cling
to the incongruity of the dual function of municipal corporations. It
will be the purpose now to discuss the case decisions as announced by the
Missouri courts.
I. GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS
Missouri joins the majority of American states in regarding the fire
department as a governmental agency." Therefore, one injured by the
negligent driving of a fire truck en route to a fire was not allowed to
recover.45 In an earlier case,48 the supreme court decided that no action
could be maintained against the city for property destroyed because the
firemen did not sufficiently exert themselves. It followed that the city
would not be liable in damages for refusing to use its fire engines to pump
water around an obstruction in a sewer, for which it was not responsible,
in order to prevent damage to abutting property owners. 7
Since the early case of Worley v. Columbia," the courts have zealously
guarded against liability being imposed upon the city for injuries arising
from the negligent conduct of the police department. It has been held
that a municipality is not liable for the unjustifiable threats made by its
officers ;49 nor for injuries resulting from the negligent operation of a patrol
44. See annotation (1920) 9 A. L. R. 143.
45. McKenna v. St. Louis, 6 Mo. App. 320 (1878).
46. Heller v. Sedalia, 53 Mo. 159 (1873).
47. Hawkins v. Springfield, 194 Mo. App. 151, 186 S. W. 576 (1916).
48. 88 Mo. 106 (1885). In this case the defendant city attempted to impose
a license tax on auctioneers. The plaintiff was arrested for failure to pay the
tax. The tax was subsequently declared invalid and the plaintiff sued for false
imprisonment. Recovery was denied.
49. Butler v. Moberly, 131 Mo. App. 172, 110 S. W. 682 (1908). This
case also points out that a city is not liable in damages for the refusal of a
6
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wagon," a necessary instrumentality in the exercise of the power of police
protection. A workhouse is similarly regarded.5 ' With the introduction
of electric traffic signals, serving to replace police officers in the direction
of traffic, the courts have been faced with a new problem. In the recent
important cause of Auslander v. St. Louis,52 the court en bano was called
upon to determine whether the municipality was liable to a plaintiff who
sustained injuries in a collision at an intersection in St. Louis, because of
a defective traffic signal. A policeman had discovered earlier that the
signal was not working properly. He had reported it five hours before
the accident, but no action was taken to correct the defect. The court
denied recovery, carefully pointing out that the signal was not an ob-
struction, and that the collision was not due to its presence. The neg-
ligence consisted in the failure of the police department, to which the
care and supervision of these signals was entrusted, to remedy the defect.
For such negligence the city was not liable. A later case58 denied recovery
to one injured when his motorcycle actually collided with the "STOP"
sign which was securely fastened to the street. The plaintiff charged that
this constituted an obstruction. The court adjudged the sign to be a
reasonable means of regulating traffic-a governmental function.
An interesting situation was presented to division two of the supreme
court for determination in Heay v. Kansas City.54 The Kansas City
Council had provided for a Fourth of July celebration in one of the city
parks. The park board, in charge of the affair, made arrangements with
a military organization to conduct a sham battle. The personnel of the
organization proved to be inadequate. The board directed the plaintiff,
along with others unfamiliar with the operation of a gun, to help. The
inexperience of the men and the crowding of the persons gathered to
watch the demonstration hampered the careful operation of the gun. The
plaintiff was injured when the gun was fired prematurely. The court,
recognizing the dual cause giving rise to the injury, denied plaintiff re-
city official to issue a peddler's license. The plaintiff's proper remedy is man-
damus.
50. Stater v. Joplin, 189 Mo. App. 383, 176 S. W. 241 (1915).
51. Ulrich v. St. Louis, 112 Mo. 138, 20 S. W. 466 (1892), where the court
held that a prisoner who was injured by a mule he was ordered to harness could
not recover because in maintaining a workhouse and committing offenders thereto,
the city was exercising a governmental function.
52. 332 Mo. 145, 56 S. W. (2d) 778 (1933).
53. Prewitt v. St. Joseph, 334 Mo. 1228, 70 S. W. (2d) 916 (1934).
54. 277 Mo. 619, 211 S. W. 59 (1919).
7
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covery. The city, it held, is not liable for the maintenance of good order
in the park. The prevention of the dangerous conditions caused by gather-
ing crowds or by the lawless or imprudent conduct of individuals is a
governmental function.5
In Cunningham v. St. Louis,"' recovery was denied one who sustained
injuries in falling into an unguarded pit adjacent to an approach to the
St. Louis courthouse. The court relied on a Missouri constitutional pro-
vision5 7 which placed the relation of the city to its courthouse on a similar
basis as that of a county to its courthouse.
In Missouri, the maintenance of a dog-pound is regarded as a govern-
mental function. Pounds are erected for the humane purpose of keeping
diseased dogs from spreading the disease and to keep them from suffering.
Yet an inhumane treatment by an attendant of the pound, resulting in
the death or injury of the dog, goes uncompensated.5 8
Without dissent, the Missouri courts have held the operation of schools
a governmental function. As a consequence thereof, they have denied
recovery for injuries caused by the wrongful act of the directors of a
school district,59 or the negligence of members of the board of education.60
In holding, as did Walker, J., in the last-cited case, that the board of
education in maintaining the schools is performing a governmental duty,
he was supported by a constitutional provision,61 which requires the es-
tablishment and maintenance of "free public schools for the gratuitous
instruction of all persons . . . between the ages of six and twenty years."
Another basis advanced regarded the school funds as being held in trust
for the exclusive purpose of the advancement of education. Any attempt
to apply them otherwise would be a diversion of trust funds. In a more
55. Id. at 628.
56. 96 Mo. 53, 8 S. W. 787 (1888).
57. Art. 9, § 23, requiring St. Louis to collect the state revenue and "per-
form all other functions in relation to the State, in the same manner, as if
it were a county."
58. Wilks v. Caruthersville, 162 Mo. App. 492, 142 S. W. 800 (1912);
Thomas v. Kennett, 178 S. W. 254 (Mo. App. 1915).
59. State ex rel. Carrollton School District v. Gordon, 231 Mo. 547, 574, 133
S. W. 44 (1910): "But a school district is but the arm and instrumentality of
the State for one single and noble purpose, viz., to educate the children of the dis-
trict. . . ."; McClure Bros. v. School District of Tipton, 79 Mo. App. 80 (1899).
60. Cochran v. Wilson, 287 Mo. 210, 229 S. W. 1050 (1921) (a pedestrian
injured by falling down the unlighted steps in a school); Dick v. Board of
Education of St. Louis, 238 S. W. 1073 (Mo. 1922) (a pupil injured due to the
negligence of an employee of the school board).
61. Mo. CONST. art. 11, § 1.
8
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recent case, 2 an employee of the school board attempted to recover for in-
juries sustained in the operation of a food-chopping machine in a school
lunch room. The plaintiff relied on the now-discredited case of Hannon
v. St. Louis County." She endeavored to support her case by pointing
out that the board was not compelled to operate a lunch room although
authorized to do so. Since, therefore, it chose to exercise its discretion in
favor of operating one, it was no longer entitled to immunity. In denying
recovery the court said: "The true ground of distinction to be observed
is not so much that the duty is mandatory rather than self-imposed pur-
suant to authority of a general law, but, is, that the duty assumed is public
in character .... "4 The court recognized that there was no logical
reason why a quasi-corporation should be liable for damages arising from
a voluntary undertaking pursuant to a general authority, when a similar
act of negligence would occasion no liability if the furnishing of the con-
venience were mandatory. The fact that in one case the legislature de-
termines the necessity and expediency and in the other the determination
is left to a local governmental agency is an insufficient basis upon which
to predicate a different rule of liability.
Having reversed an earlier case,6 5 Missouri now numbers among the
majority of states68 in holding that the cleaning or sprinkling of streets
and the removal of rubbish and garbage therefrom is a governmental func-
tion designed to promote the public health and comfort. The city, there-
fore, is not liable for the torts of its employees in this field. 7 The recent
case of Lober v. Kansas City"8 presented a factual situation which required
the court to choose between conflicting legal rules. The plaintiff sued the
city to recover for damages to his printing shop and merchandise. The
loss, amounting to $25,000, was caused by water flowing from a street
hydrant because an employee of the street cleaning department, in at-
tempting to shut off the water, exerted too much pressure and broke the
62. Krueger v. Board of Education of St. Louis, 310 Mo. 239, 274 S. W.
811 (1925).
63. 62 Mo. 313 (1876).
64. Krueger v. Board of Education of St. Louis, 310 Mo. 239, 248, 274 S. W.
811 (1925).
65. Young v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 126 Mo. App. 1, 103 S. W. 135 (1907).
66. See annotation (1921) 14 A. L. R. 1473.
67. Cassidy v. St. Joseph, 247 Mo. 197, 152 S. W. 306 (1912) (plaintiff's
husband was killed by a runaway horse used by the city in collecting refuse);
Behrmann v. St. Louis, 273 Mo. 578, 201 S. W. 547 (1918) (plaintiff injured when
team of horses attached to garbage collecting wagon ran into a ladder on which
plaintiff was standing).
68. 74 S. W. (2d) 815 (Mo. 1934).
9
Freedman: Freedman:Liability in Tort of Municipal Corporations
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1938
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
stem. The hydrant, part of the city-owned waterworks, was used either
for the extinguishing of fires by the fire department or for the cleaning of
streets by the street department. Recovery was denied. Sturgis, C., an-
nounced the traditional rule that a city was liable for injuries arising
from the negligence of its operation of the waterworks, but added:
"In applying the above rule, however, we are met with the
rule that in controlling or preventing loss by fire, and in protecting
the health of its inhabitants by keeping its streets clean and
sanitary, the city is exercising its governmental powers and is not
liable for negligence in doing so .... 9
The court found that the fire hydrant in question was used only in the
performance of governmental functions and that the employee guilty
of the negligent act worked for the street cleaning department. It, there-
fore, adjudged the damage as arising "from the exercise by the city of
one of its governmental functions by the negligent act of a governmental
employee in the performance of a governmental duty."70
The case is important also for its expressed disapproval of the case of
De Mayo v. Kansas City.71 The facts in the latter case were substantially
the same as those in the Lober case. The Kansas City Court of Appeals,
whose decision was affirmed by the Missouri Supreme Court, relying on
the case of Stifel v. St. Louis,7 2 regarded the hydrant as an obstruction
to the street. The court considered it as much the duty of the city, in
fulfillment of its duty to maintain the street in a reasonably safe condi-
tion, to stop the flow of water as to remove a wrongful obstruction in a
street. The court of appeals drew a distinction between damages resulting
from negligence in cleaning the street from deleterious substances as a
health measure by use of manual labor, teams and carts, previously ad-
judged governmental, and the mere flushing of the streets with quantities
of water drawn from a hydrant served by city-owned waterworks. That
this unrealistic distinction has been judicially disapproved is, unlike the
result, commendable.
69. Id. at 819. This case overrules sub silentio the case of Adams v. Frank-
ford, 251 S. W. 125 (Mo. App. 1923), a case in which the city was held liable
for the destruction of plaintiff's property due to the negligence of its employee in
piling up and burning brushwood which he had swept off the city street. In
reaching the decision the court of appeals relied upon cases dealing with street
obstructions, rather than street cleaning.
70. Id. at 823.
71. 210 S. W. 380 (Mo. 1919).
72. 181 S. W. 577 (Mo. 1915).
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In the maintenance of a city hospital, the municipality is performing
a governmental function. The city of St. Louis, therefore, was held not
liable to a charitable hospital patient for injuries resulting from the neg-
ligence of its servants at that institution.7" Kansas City was held excused
from liability for the death of plaintiff's husband, killed by an insane
patient in whose cell he was placed, in the case of Zummo v. Kansas City.74
The court is clearly correct in denominating the preservation of the public
health as the performance of a public act. The judicial tolerance of con-
duct present in the instant case is less praiseworthy.
The enactment of city ordinances is obviously a legislative act. No
liability is incurred, therefore, by a municipality for its failure to pass, 5 or
enforce,7 ordinances. Nor is the city liable for failure to abate a nuisance
existing on private property. The city in adopting a plan for public
improvements is acting in its governmental capacity,7" but in the later
paragraphs it will be shown that once erected, the maintenance of the im-
provement is a ministerial act upon which liability may be based.7 9
In Brightwell v. Kansas City,8 the plaintiff sought to recover for the
neglect of the city treasurer to issue a certificate to the purchaser of prop-
erty at a sale under an assessment levied for the maintenance of parks
and boulevards. In denying recovery to the plaintiff, the court rested
its decision on the ground that in planning parks and boulevards, in
condemning the necessary land, and in levying taxes to pay for such land,
the municipality acts in the performance of governmental functions.
73. Murtaugh v. St. Louis, 44 Mo. 479 (1869).
74. 285 Mo. 222, 225 S. W. 934 (1920).
75. Moore v. Cape Girardeau, 103 Mo. 470, 15 S. W. 755 (1890).
76. Harman v. St. Louis, 137 Mo. 494, 38 S. W. 1102 (1897) (city failed
to prevent building of a wooden structure as required by ordinance); Butz v.
Cavanaugh, 137 Mo. 503, 38 S. W. 1104 (1897) (dangerous excavation); Sallee
v. St. Louis, 152 Mo. 615, 54 S. W. 463 (1899) (failure to remove carcasses with-
in six hours as required by ordinance); Ryan v. Kansas City, 232 Mo. 471, 134
S. W. 566 (1911) (failure to enforce ordinance requiring barricade and lights
at excavations); Salmon v. Kansas City, 241 Mo. 14, 145 S. W. 16 (1912) (failure
to enforce ordinance regarding use and storage of explosives).
77. Armstrong v. Brunswick, 79 Mo. 319 (1883); Kiley v. Kansas City,
87 Mo. 103 (1885); Trower v. Louisiana, 198 Mo. App. 352, 200 S W. 763
(1918). Cf. Frick v. Kansas City, 117 Mo. App. 488, 93 S. W. 351 (1906)
(nuisance on public property).
78. Ely v. St. Louis, 181 Mo. 723, 81 S. W. 168 (1904); Woods v. Kansas
City, 58 Mo. App. 272 (1894).
79. See text at note 98 et seq.
80. 153 Mo. App. 519, 134 S. W. 87 (1911).
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II. PROPaRETARY FUNCTIONS
It has already been mentioned 8 that some of the activities performed
by municipalities have been judicially classified as proprietary. In the
performance of these functions the municipal corporation is generally
adjudged liable for negligent conduct in connection therewith on the same
basis as a private person or corporation.
Generally, the supplying of electricity, a function sometimes per-
formed by private companies and now increasingly performed by municipal
corporations, has been considered a non-governmental function. By judicial
decision Missouri was placed in this category when Graves, J., in the case
of Riley v. Independence,82 said: "Cities undertaking to run the lighting
business must assume the same responsibilities as private persons and
private corporations running like plants." Some years before this de-
cision, the legislature, seeking to encourage the erection of municipal
waterworks, passed an act exempting cities of the second, third, and fourth
classes from liability "on account of negligence in the operation of the
waterworks plant."'8 3 This statute was invoked to preclude recovery from
a municipality for damages resulting from the failure of the city to furnish
steam for the operation of a mine, according to its agreement." In 1919,
an act was passed which sought to extend the same immunity to the erec-
tion and purchase of electric light plants, gas plants, and other public
utilities.85 The following year the statute granting exemption to the city
for torts committed in the operation of its waterworks, was declared un-
constitutional because the title to the act did not divulge its entire con-
tent.8 6 Apparently, overlooking this declaration of unconstitutionality, the
supreme court granted recovery to one burned by an uninsulated high
voltage wire blown against him. A very questionable interpretation of the
statute was adopted. 7  In the most recent case, no mention is made of
81. See notes 33 to 42, supra.
82. 258 Mo. 671, 681, 167 S. W. 1022 (1914), holding the city liable for
injuries sustained by its employee in an electric light plant due to a defectively
constructed and maintained switch, which it was the duty of the injured person
to use.
83. Mo. Laws 1905, p. 85; Mo. Rmv. STAT. (1919) § 9119; id. (1909) §
9944.
84. Stroup v. Kirksville, 215 S. W. 903 (Mo. App. 1919).
85. Mo. Laws 1919, p. 602.
86. Vice v. Kirksville, 280 Mo. 348, 217 S. W. 77 (1920). The statute
does not appear in the 1929 revision of the Missouri statutes.
87. Thompson v. Lamar, 322 Mo. 514, 17 S. W. (2d) 960 (1929). The de-
fendant city sought exemption under the statute (see note 83, supra), which, by
the amendment of 1919 (see note 85, supra), now applied also to electric light
plants. The court rejected the defendant's contention that the exemption ex-
tended to torts committed in the operation of a light plant, by pursuing the fol-
12
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the statute.88 The usual recovery for injuries inflicted as a result of neg-
ligence in the operation of an electric plant was permitted.
Few persons would deny that public parks are designed to provide
places for recreation, amusement, and relaxation. 9 Yet, since 1891, munici-
palities in fissouri are adjudged to maintain public parks in a quasi-
private capacity. 0 In the first case arising from an attempt to hold a city
responsible for the drowning of a boy in a pond in a public park, the court
was able to hold the city liable for maintaining a nuisance.91 Surprisingly
enough, in an earlier case,9 2 in which recovery was denied to the parents
of an eleven year old boy who, despite previous reprimands, climbed over
a four and one-half foot fence surrounding the reservoir and was drowned,
the question of the duty of the city to persons using the parks was not
lowing reasoning: "Section 9119, in exempting a municipality from actionable
liability for negligence respecting waterworks plants, uses the word 'operation'
whereas the new Section 9111, enacted in 1919, uses the words 'erection or pur-
chase' in providing that the provisions of the several sections of the article, 'which
concern the purchase of waterworks', shall apply, so far as the same are ap-
plicable, to electric light plants and other public utilities. Had it been the intent
of the General Assembly, in enacting new Section 9111, to exempt municipalities
from actionable liability for negligence in the operation of electric light and
power plants, as in the case of the operation of waterworks plants (as provided
in Sec. 9119), it is clear to our minds that the law-making body of the State
would have used the word 'operation' instead of, or in addition to, the words
'erection or purchase', in enacting Section 9111."
88. Roberts v. Lamar, 99 S. W. (2d) 498 (Mo. App. 1936). In this case
plaintiff was employed by the Federal Emergency Relief Committee, which
agreed to send its men to work for the defendant city. Plaintiff was ordered
to trim tree branches along a power line used in supplying electricity for street
lighting. The work was supervised by a foreman employed by the city. The
attempt of the defendant city to establish that by lending the services of the light
superintendent for the purposes of supervising the work relief, it was engaged
in the administration of a public charity, was rejected by the court which pointed
out that the city had nothing to do with the administration of the relief funds.
Liability was imposed on the ground that the trimming of trees to protect the
light wires was a ministerial function.
89. See Woodson, J., in Capp. v. St. Louis, 251 Mo. 345, 158 S. W. 616
(1913), where he points out that the park provides for the poor persons what
the sea shore provides for the wealthy. "It is largely for this protection of life
and limb, and the separation of the youth of the country from vice and dangers,
that these parks are created and maintained. .. ."
90. State ex rel. Wood v. Schweickardt, 109 Mo. 496, 19 S. W. 47 (1891)
(case did not involve the tort liability of a city but was concerned with the right
of a city to lease the right of selling liquor in a public park).
91. Capp v. St. Louis, 251 Mo. 345, 158 S. W. 616 (1913). This case is often
cited as a leading case sustaining the rule that in the maintaining of a park a
city acts in a proprietary capacity. A careful reading of the opinion discloses
that the court regarded the pond in which the boy was drowned, which pond
was created by the washing away of the Des Peres River bed by the drainage
from the Euclid Avenue Storm Sewer, as a nuisance. At 353, Woodson, J., refers
to the "horrible nuisance" and at p. 352 to the "inexcusable nuisance". At 362:
"The same law that requires a municipal corporation to keep its streets free
from nuisances, and reasonably safe for those who lawfully use them, also
imposes upon it the duty to keep its public parks and other public places in a
reasonably safe condition for all who lawfully frequent and use them." (Italics
the writer's.)
92. Carey v. Kansas City, 187 Mo. 715, 86 S. W. 438 (1905).
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mentioned. Since, however, the court centered its consideration upon the
question of negligence, the duty must inferentially have been assumed.
Subsequent cases, however, have unmistakingly established the existence
of such duty. Recovery is now granted for injuries sustained as a result
of defective amusement devices,9 3 unguarded holes,94 pools,95 and comfort
stations. 8 Where the injured person knew of the existence of the danger-
ous condition and proceeded in disregard of such knowledge, recovery is
denied, in spite of the fact that it is incumbent on the city to maintain the
parks in a reasonably safe condition.'
Unlike quasi-corporations,98 municipal corporations are liable in dam-
ages for injuries sustained as a result of the defective condition of side-
walks99 sewers,100 alleys,110 and streets.10 To such actions the usual prin-
93. Longwell v. Kansas City, 199 Mo. App. 480, 203 S. W. 657 (1918)
(violent pony); Muser v. Kansas City, 249 S. W. 681 (Mo. App. 1923) (de-
fective "teeter-totter"); Gwartney v. Springfield, 93 S. W. (2d) 62 (Mo. App.
1936) (defective sliding board).
94. Edmonston v. Kansas City, 227 Mo. App. 817, 57 S. W. (2d) 690 (1933)(unguarded manhole).
95. Nation v. St. Joseph, 5 S. W. (2d) 1106 (Mo. App. 1928) (pool).
96. Keunzel v. St. Louis, 278 Mo. 277, 212 S. W. 876 (1919) (plaintiff in-
jured while entering a rest .room provided for women in the pavilion in O'Fallon
Park, due to the defective condition of the passageway).
97. Bagby v. Kansas City, 92 S. W. (2d) 142 (Mo. 1936) (loose rock);
Volz v. St. Louis, 326 Mo. 362, 32 S. W. (2d) 72 (1930) (thin ice).
98. Counties are not liable for injuries caused by the defective conditions of
the highways: Reardon v. St. Louis County, 36 Mo. 555 (1865); Swineford
v. Franklin County, 73 Mo. 279 (1880); Clark v. Adair County, 79 Mo. 536(1883); Reed v. Howell County, 125 Mo. 58, 28 S. W. 177 (1894); Moxley v.
Pike County, 276 Mo. 449, 208 S. W. 246 (1918). The only case holding contra,
Hannon v. St. Louis County, 62 Mo. 313 (1876), has been expressly disapproved
by both divisions of the Missouri Supreme Court: Moxley v. Pike County, supra;
Cochran v. Wilson, 287 Mo. 210, 229 S. W. 1050 (1921). In Kansas City v.
Holmes, 274 Mo. 159, 202 S. W. 392 (1918), the court attempted to justify the
different treatment afforded cities and counties in dealing with the liability
for the negligence of its officers and agents by suggesting that cities are or-
ganized with a view to profit by the group which takes the initiative in getting
the charter, and whose ambition in this connection is increased by the Drospec-
tive profit which comes from a system of streets, alleys and other urban im-
provements. The state provides a plan by which the ambition of inhabitants of
a small contiguous area may be utilized for the benefits of the urban corpora-
tions, and the corporation is given authority to control the improvements. The
establishment of a county is automatic and will exist although no person may
have urged its creation.
99. Hebenheimer v. St. Louis, 269 Mo. 92, 189 S. W. 1180 (1916): Gray v.
Hannibal, 29 S. W. (2d) 710 (Mo. 1930); Lovins v. St. Louis, 336 Mo. 1194,
84 S. W. (2d) 127 (1935); Barrett v. Canton, 93 S. W. (2d) 927 (Mo. 1936);
Proctor v. Poplar Bluff, 184 S. W. 123 (Mo. App. 1916); Reed v. St. Joseph,
218 Mo. App. 651, 266 S. W. 330 (1924); Scanlan v. Kansas City, 223 Mo. App.
1203, 19 S. W. (2d) 522 (1929) ; Williams v. City of Mexico. 224 Mo. App. 1224,
34 S. W. (2d) 992 (1931); Vick v. DeSoto, 86 S. W. (2d) 367 (Mo. App. 1935).
100. Woods v. Kansas City, 58 Mo. App. 272 (1894); Geiger v. St. Joseph,
198 S. W. 78 (Mo. App. 1917); Kinlough v. Maplewood, 201 S. W. 625 (Mo.
App. 1918).
101. Asbury v. Kansas City, 161 Mo. Apn. 496. 144 S. W. 127 (1912).
102. Halpin v. Kansas City, 76 Mo. 335 (1882); Tritz v. Kansas City,
84 Mo. 632 (1884); Maus v. Springfield, 101 Mo. 613, 14 S. W. 630 (1890);
14
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ciples of tort law apply. 08 While the city is not an insurer of the safety
of its streets, 1 4 its obligation to maintain them in a reasonably safe con-
dition for travel is continuing ° and non-delegable. 06 The duty is not
affected nor the liability lessened because the defect was created, or the
obstruction placed thereon, by a third person.117 It is material only that
the city knew, or by the exercise of ordinary care would have known, of
its condition and had a reasonable time to correct the defect or remove
the obstruction. 0 8 The obligation commences with the city's acknowledg-
Franke v. St. Louis, 110 Mo. 516, 19 S. W. 938 (1892); Vogelgesang v. St.
Louis, 139 Mo. 127, 40 S. W. 653 (1897); Warren v. Independence, 153 Mo.
593, 55 S. W. 227 (1900); Ball v. Independence, 41 Mo. App. 469 (1890);
Burnes v. St. Joseph, 91 Mo. App. 489 (1902); Nelson v. Kansas City, 170 Mo.
App. 542, 157 S. W. 94 (1913) ; O'Gorman v. Kansas City, 93 S. W. (2d) 1132
(Mo. App. 1936); Fadem v. St. Louis, 99 S. W. (2d) 511 (Mo. App. 1936).
103. Proximate cause: Lindman v. Altman, 308 Mo. 187, 271 S. W. 512
(1925). Contributory negligence: Waldmann v. Skrainka Construction Co., 289
Mo. 622, 233 S. W. 242 (1921); Maxwell v. Kansas City, 227 Mo. App. 234, 52
S. W. (2d) 487 (1932). Exercise of reasonable care by plaintiff: Wheat v.
St. Louis, 179 Mo. 572, 78 S. W: 790 (1904).
104. Acker v. Kansas City, 104 S. W. (2d) 1055 (Mo. App. 1937).
105. Barr v. Kansas City, 105 Mo. 550, 16 S. W. 483 (1891); Brake v.
Kansas City, 100 Mo. App. 611, 75 5. W. 191 (1903); Trippensee v. Jefferson
City, 174 Mo. App. 727, 161 S. W. 303 (1913).
106. Blake v. St. Louis, 40 Mo. 569 (1867); Bassett v. St. Joseph, 53 Mo.
290 (1873); Welsh v. St. Louis, 73 Mo. 71 (1880) (overruling Barry v. St.
Louis, 17 Mo. 121 (1852)); Russell v. Columbia, 74 Mo. 480 (1881); Haniford
v. Kansas City, 103 Mo. 172, 15 S. W. 753 (1890); Hunt v. St. Louis, 278 Mo.
213, 211 S. W. 673 (1919); Ahlfeldt v. City of Mexico, 108 S. W. 122 (Mo. App.
1908) ; Schlinski v. St. Joseph, 170 Mo. App. 380, 156 S. W. 823 (1913) ; Burton
v. Kansas City, 181 Mo. App. 427, 168 S. W. 889 (1914).
107. Plater v. Kansas City, 334 Mo. 842, 68 S. W. (2d) 800 (1934); Caton
v. Sedalia, 62 Mo. App. 227 (1895); Waltemeyer v. Kansas City, 71 Mo. App.
354 (1897); Burnes v. St. Joseph, 91 Mo. App. 489 (1902); Barker v. Jefferson
City, 155 Mo. App. 390, 137 S. W. 10 (1911).
108. Bonine v. Richmond, 75 Mo. 437 (1882); Jordan v. Hannibal, 87 Mo.
673 (1885); Young v. Webb City, 150 Mo. 333, 51 S. W. 709 (1899); Smart v.
Kansas City, 208 Mo. 162, 105 S. W. 709 (1907); Hitchings v. Maryville, 134
Mo. App. 712, 115 S. W. 473 (1909); Cooper v. Caruthersville, 264 S. W. 46
(Mo. App. 1924). In the following cases the city was held not liable because
it did not appear that the city had a reasonable time in which to remove the ob-
struction: Vonkey v. St. Louis, 219 Mo. 37, 117 S. W. 733 (1909); Richardson v.
Marceline, 73 Mo. App. 360 (1898); Allen v. Kansas City, 64 S. W. (2d) 765 (Mo.
App. 1933).
The "ought to have known" requirement is more readily imposed upon a
municipality because it has a duty to inspect the condition of the city streets.
Miller v. Canton, 112 Mo. App. 322, 87 S. W. 96 (1905). Where the unsafe
condition is caused by one acting under the authority of the city, or by one hav-
ing a permit authorizing the construction, the city is liable for injuries regardless
of notice. Stephens v. Macon, 83 Mo. 345 (1884); Carrington v. St. Louis, 89
Mo. 208, 1 S. W. 240 (1886); Lindsay v. Kansas City, 195 Mo. 166, 93 S. W.
273 (1906); Heberling v. Warrensburg, 204 Mo. 604, 103 S. W. 36 (1907);
Merritt v. Kinloch Telephone Co., 215 Mo. 299, 115 ,. W. 19 (1908); Mehan
v. St. Louis, 217 Mo. 35, 116 S. W. 514 (1909); Buttron v. Bridell, 228 Mo.
622, 129 S. W. 12 (1910) ; Smith v. St. Joseph, 42 Mo. App. 392 (1890); Golden
v. Clinton, 54 Mo. App. 100 (1893). Cf. Haniford v. Kansas City, 103 Mo. 172,
15 S. W. 753 (1890) (pedestrian fell into unguarded and unlighted excavation
made for a cable railway. The case makes no distinction between cases in
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ment of the street to be such, either by a formal or tacit acceptance mani-
fested in the silent acquiescence of the city in the use by the public of the
path as a street.' In Missouri the obligation exists in the absence of
statute and is said to be implied from the city's duty to construct and con-
trol streets."10 Yet, the only misfeasance which will support an action
against the city is want of care in the constructing or maintaining of the
street,"' and not negligence in adopting an improper plan for construc-
tion,1 2 unless the plan is patently dangerous and unsafe."'
The purpose for which the injured person was using the street at the
time of the accident is immaterial," 4 so long as the injury occurred on the
property which the municipality was to maintain.. 5
which an independent contractor was employed by the city, and those in which
employment was by a licensor); Hunt v. St. Louis, 278 Mo. 213, 211 S. W. 673
(1919), where the court carelessly refers to city's liability "upon notice". The
discrepancy may be dismissed by regarding the pronouncement as lacking in
precision of phraseology.
109. Pierce v. Lutesville, 25 Mo. App. 317 (1887). But before liability
may be imposed upon the city there must have been some act of acceptance
of the street. Scheffer v. Hardin, 140 Mo. App. 13, 124 S. W. 569 (1910);
Drimmel v. Kansas City, 180 Mo. App. 339, 168 S. W. 280 (1914). Cf. Clinken-
beard v. St. Joseph, 10 S. W. (2d) 54 (Mo. 1928) (street not yet open).
110. Carthage v. Garner, 209 Mo. 688, 108 S. W. 521 (1908).
111. Ely v. St. Louis, 181 Mo. 723, 81 S. W. 168 (1904); Woods v. Kansas
City, 58 Mo. App. 272 (1894).
112. Hays v. Columbia, 159 Mo. App. 431, 141 S. W. 3 (1911). Imler v.
Springfield, 55 Mo. 119 (1874); Saxton v. St. Joseph, 60 Mo. 153 (1875); Weg-
mann v. Jefferson City, 61 Mo. 55 (1875) ; Foster v. St. Louis, 71 Mo. 157 (1879);
Cf. Gallagher v. Tipton, 133 Mo. App. 557, 113 S. W. 674 (1908).
113. Hinds v. Marshall, 22 Mo. App. 208 (1886); Henson v. Kansas City,
277 Mo. 443, 210 S. W. 13 (1919) (dictum).
114. Donoho v. Vulcan Iron-Works, 7 Mo. App. 447 (1879), aff'd, 75 Mo. 401
(1882) (boy playing in the street); Straub v. St. Louis, 175 Mo. 413, 75 S. W.
100 (1903) (boy playing on the sidewalk). Cf. Williams v. St. Joseph, 166 Mo.
App. 299, 148 S. W. 459 (1912), where one who was injured by falling into an
excavation in the street while riding a bicycle, in violation of a statute, was
denied recovery.
115. Arnold v. St. Louis, 152 Mo. 173, 53 S. W. 900 (1899) (no recovery
because it was not conclusively shown whether the child was on public or private
property at the time of the drowning). Cf. Goldsmith v. Kennett, 78 S. W.
(2d) 146 (1934) (city not liable to plaintiff who tripped over an unguarded
water meter because an ordinance places the duty to keep all water pipes and
fixtures in repair on the consumer, and, therefore, the city owed the plaintiff
no duty, but the duty was owed by the property owner himself).
A very interesting situation was presented to the court in the recent
case of Lowery v. Kansas City, 337 Mo. 47, 85 S. W. (2d) 104 (1935). The
plaintiff sued the city for injuries suffered when an automobile, in which she
was riding on a bridge within the corporate limits of the defendant city, was
overturned upon striking a steel girder which extended about two and one-
half feet above the surface of the bridge, and some thirteen and one-half feet
from the curb. The warning light had been broken four months before the day
when the plaintiff was injured, and had never been replaced. The plaintiff's case
was based entirely upon the city's common-law duty with recard to keeping
"the public streets within its corporate limits in a safe condition and fit for
public travel." The bridge in question was built by a private company and
operated as a toll bridge. In 1927, after Kansas City had approved a bond
16
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The obligation of the municipality to keep its streets free from inter-
fering obstructions is so zealously enforced that it was given preference
over the principle of non-liability for the torts of the police in Carrington
v. St. Louis.118 Where, however, a municipality keeps such a part of the
street in reasonable repair as may be necessary for the use of the travelling
public, it is generally not liable for injury sustained by one who, in the
exercise of ordinary care, may be injured on some other part of the street
over which he was passing, which was out of repair, notwithstanding the
city may have ordered the street to be open.117
In applying the rules to varying situations, the court has imposed
liability on a municipality for the following: injuries sustained by travelers
in a carriage, which fell into an unguarded hole dug in the street for the
purpose of connecting the water main with a house ;118 for the drowning
of a child in a pool formed on the property of an abutting owner as a con-
sequence of the city"s failure to provide adequate drainage in a ravine
across which the city was constructing a highway embankment ;19 and
for damages caused by the backing-up of water due to a clogged-up drain. 20
Liability may be imposed upon a municipality for its failure to remove ice
and snow from the city streets. 2 No recovery, however, may be had for
issue for the purpose, the city purchased the bridge and tendered it free to
the State Highway Department, in consideration of its "becoming and con-
stituting a part of the state highway system and maintained as such by said
Commission" by virtue of Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 8139. The Highway Com-
mission accepted the title in the name of the state, the city assuming the obliga-
tion to install and maintain adequate lights for the lighting of said bridge at their
own cost in accordance with the plans and regulations of the Highway Com-
mission. In a lengthy opinion (per Hyde, C.), recovery was denied on the grounds
that the place where the plaintiff was injured was not one of the defendant's
streets but was a part of the state highway system. Therefore, defendant owed
no duty with the respect to the safety of the place where she was injured. Nor
could the plaintiff recover on the theory that the city violated a contract with
the Highway Commission by failing to maintain a light on the girder because
there was no proof of any regulation of the State Highway Commission requiring
a light to be on the girder.
116. 89 Mo. 208, 1 S. W. 240 (1886) (plaintiff fell over a door, leading to the
basement of a police station, negligently left open into the street). Cf. Barree v.
Cape Girardeau, 197 Mo. 382, 95 S. W. 330 (1906), where the city was held re-
sponsible for an assault committed by an employee engaged in repairing a city
street.
117. Bassett v. St. Joseph, 53 Mo. 290 (1873); Craig v. Sedalia, 63 Mo.
417 (1876); Ely v. St. Louis, 181 Mo. 723, 81 S. W. 168 (1904).
118. Lindsay v. Kansas City, 195 Mo. 166, 93 S. W. 273 (1906).
119. Davoren v. Kansas City, 308 Mo. 513, 273 S. W. 401 (1925).
120. Kinlough v. Maplewood, 201 S. W. 625 (Mo. App. 1918).
121. Suttmoeller v. St. Louis, 230 S. W. 67 (Mo. 1921); Beane v. St.
Joseph, 211 Mo. App. 200, 240 S. W. 840 (1922) ; Smith v. St. Joseph, 250 S. W.
616 (Mo. App. 1923); Harding v. St. Joseph, 222 Mo. App. 749, 7 S. W. (2d)
707 (1928); Wood v. St. Joseph, 226 Mo. App. 615, 44 S. W. (2d) 248 (1931).
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injuries arising out of a collision with a safety gate placed at a railroad
crossing."'
Liability of a municipality for injuries sustained as a result of the
negligence of an independent contractor engaged by the city has had a
somewhat kaleidoscopic history. In the early case of Barry v. St. Louis, ' 3
it was held that the city was not liable to one injured in falling into an
open sewer. The court considered it proper to hold the contractor alone
liable since it was he who was in complete control of the management and
construction. The holding was soon overruled in Welsh v. St. Louis,124
where the court criticized the Barry case for its failure to consider whether
the city was negligent in failing to discharge its duty of maintaining the
streets in a reasonably safe condition for travel. Subsequent adjudications
leave no doubt of the responsibility of the city for injuries suffered as a re-
sult of the negligence of independent contractors employed in repairing or
constructing the roads.' 25 A stipulation in the contract obligating the con-
tractor to take precautions in respect to the performance of the work under-
taken by him will not exempt the city from its liability. 2 Yet, where a
child picked up an unexploded dynamite cap, negligently left in the street
several weeks prior by an independent contractor who had found it neces-
sary to do some blasting in fulfilling his contractual undertaking with the
city, the court refused to attach responsibility on the city, as a matter of
law. It considered that the injury did not result from the performance by
the contractor of his contract with the city, but from a negligent act col-
lateral to the work itself.12 7 It thereby becomes a jury question whether in
failing to discover and remove the dynamite caps, the city had failed to
maintain the streets in a reasonably safe condition.
The same obligation, i. e., of maintaining the streets in a reasonably
But generally liability is not imposed where the condition is general throughout
the city, and there has not been a sufficient time within which to remove the
ice and snow. Wolf v. Kansas City, 296 Mo. 95, 246 S. W. 236 (1922); Rice
v. Kansas City, 16 9. W. (2d) 659 (Mo. App. 1929).
122. Seibert v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 188 Mo. 657, 87 S. W. 995 (1905).
123. 17 Mo. 121 (1852).
124. 73 Mo. 71 (1880) (city liable to one who fell into a sewer left un-
guarded by an independent contractor).
125. Russell v. Columbia, 74 Mo. 480 (1881) (open ditch); Haniford v.
Kansas City, 103 Mo. 172, 15 S. W. 753 (1890) (unlighted excavation); Hunt
v. St. Louis, 278 Mo. 213, 211 S. W. 673 (1919) (rock pile); Ray v. Poplar Bluff,
70 Mo. App. 252 (1897) (open hole); Schlinski v. St. Joseph, 170 Mo. App. 380,
156 S. W. 823 (1913) (plank).
126. Russell v. Columbia, 74 Mo. 480 (1881).
127. Gerber v. Kansas City, 304 Mo. 157, 263 S. W. 432 (1924). Cf. Salmon
v. Kansas City, 241 Mo. 14, 145 S. W. 16 (1912).
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safe condition, is invoked to support recovery for injuries received by per-
sons using the street, but caused, not by a defect in the street itself, but
rather by a billboard,128 or sign 29 overhanging the street.
A somewhat different treatment is accorded cases in which the negli-
gence of an independent contractor has resulted in injuring abutting
property. In Holman v. Clark,'3 0 the city was held not liable to plaintiff
whose property was damaged by an explosion of dynamite stored on a
street adjacent to the property. The court announced that while the city
owed a duty to persons using the streets to keep them free of nuisances,
there was no corresponding duty in the city to provide the same protec-
tion to adjacent owners. As to the latter, a condition precedent to the
liability of the municipality is the obtaining of knowledge that the dan-
gerous condition existed. Knowledge of a police officer that a workman
carried a few sticks of dynamite into a shed was not regarded as sufficient
to justify imputing knowledge to the city that dangerous quantities of
dynamite had been stored therein, especially when the dynamite was
not needed in the work. The decision was based on an earlier case,'1'
which held that "the city was under no duty or obligation to protect
adjoining property against the negligence of a contractor, when the
plan of the work is reasonable and not liable to work injury if properly
carried out." When, however, the city failed to notify the abutting owner
of the projected work, recovery was allowed.' 2
Recovery by injured property owners for damages resulting from the
change of a grade,"' or from negligent construction,' 8 is permitted by
128. Shippey v. Kansas City, 254 Mo. 1, 162 S. W. 137 (1913); Vandevere
v. Kansas City, 187 Mo. App. 297, 173 S. W. 696 (1915).
129. Loth v. Columbia Theatre Co., 197 Mo. 328, 94 S. W. 847 (1906).
Cf. Miller v. Kansas City, 157 Mo. App. 533, 137 S. W. 998 (1911) (recovery
denied because sign was not loose long enough to impute knowledge of its condi-
tion to the city).
130. 272 Mo. 266, 198 S. W. 868 (1917).
131. Sappington v. Centralia, 162 Mo. App. 418, 144 S. W. 1112 (1912)
(property damaged by a backing-up of rain water, due to the fact that a trench-
digging machine had broken down and stopped up the culvert).
132. Gerst v. St. Louis, 185 Mo. 191, 84 S. W. 34 (1904). But where
plaintiff had actual notice, see McGrath v. St. Louis, 215 Mo. 191, 114 S. W. 611
(1908).
133. Davis v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 119 Mo. 180, 24 S. W. 777 (1893); Hick-
man v. Kansas City, 120 Mo. 110, 25 S. W. 225, (1894); Cole v. St. Louis, 132
Mo. 633, 34 S. W. 469 (1896); Faust v. Pope, 132 Mo. App. 287, 111 S. W. 878(1908).
134. White v. Springfield, 189 Mo. App. 228, 173 S. W. 1090 (1915) (water
collected as a result of unevenly paved surface).
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virtue of a Missouri constitutional provision ordering the payment for a
"taking or damaging" of property. 135
III. NON-LIABIjTY IRRESPECTIVE op NATURE Op ACT
In some instances the courts invoke the rule of non-liability irrespec-
tive of the nature of the act out of which the cause of action arose. Where
the act relied upon, or in the course of which the injury occurred, is wholly
beyond the corporate powers, or ultra vires, no liability arises against the
municipality. Recovery, therefore, is denied to one injured on a defective
sidewalk which the city council had no power to order constructed because
it was situated beyond the corporate boundary.13 An attempt by a city to
erect and maintain a tourist camp is "wholly ultra vires", and, therefore,
the city is not liable for damages resulting from the offensive odors emitted
from a cesspool employed in connection with the camp. 3 7
Generally, municipal corporations, just as private corporations, are
not responsible for injuries caused by their agents acting in excess of the
authority conferred upon them. 3 8 Hence, where a municipality hired a
construction company to pave an alley already laid out, and the company
went beyond the limits of the alley and excavated under the plaintiff's
abutting property, the city was not liable. "Whatever the contractor may
have done outside of the limits of the alley . . . the city was not respon-
sible therefor ... .,139
As a result of the cases so far, it can be said that in order for a person,
injured as a result of negligence for which the municipality is responsible,
to recover damages for his injuries, he must show not only that the duty
violated was connected with a proprietary activity of the municipal cor-
poration, but he must also prove: (1) the negligent person was a servant
of the municipality; (2) the act in connection with which the tort was
committed was within the corporate powers of the municipality; (3) the
135. Mo. CONST. art. 2, § 21.
136. Stealey v. Kansas City, 179 Mo. 400, 78 S. W. 599 (1904).
137. Kennedy v. Nevada, 222 Mo. App. 459, 281 S. W. 56 (1926).
138. Hilsdorf v. St. Louis, 45 Mo. 94 (1869) (mayor had no authority to
bind the city by contract to pay for the removal of carcasses): Rowland v.
Gallatin, 75 Mo. 134 (1881) (officer removed private land to build a street);
Bigelow v. Springfield, 178 Mo. App. 463, 162 S. W. 750 (1914) (official acted in
absence of city ordinance authorizing action).
139. McGrath v. St. Louis, 215 Mo. 191, 114 S. W. 611 (1908).
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offending official was acting within the scope of his authority; and (4) he
was not guilty of contributory negligence. 40
IV. LiAAm~iuy IRRESPECTIVE OF NATURE OF THE ACT
A municipality which, in the performance of even a governmental func-
tion, creates a nuisance is liable to persons injured therefrom, regardless
of any act of negligence on its part.' While the courts have judicially
determined that fire houses,'4 2 sandpits, 14 3 and safety gates,'4 were not
nuisances, the following have been declared nuisances: a septic tank from
which offensive stench emitted,'45 railroad side track erected above the
street grade causing surface water to back-up, 4 ' disposal of dead animals
resulting in pollution of private waters, 4 7 embankments,"", improper dis-
posal of sewage, 49 and the piling up of large quantities of dirt.5'
The municipality is liable also for the trespass committed by its agents
and servants acting under its command, in relation to a matter within the
scope of its corporate powers.' This rule was invoked to impose respon-
sibility upon a municipality for the destruction of a house. The city
council, in the purported exercise of its statutory power to "prevent and
remove nuisance" had ordered the destruction. The court held that the
statute did not give the council power to declare what was a nuisance, and
even if the building in question was being put to so hazardous a use as to
be a nuisance, that would only have justified a suppression of the use and
not the destruction of the building. 5 2
140. MCQuILLEN, op. cit. supra note 7, at § 2780.
141. Holman v. Clark, 272 Mo. 266, 198 S. W. 868 (1917); state ex rel.
Hog Haven Farms v. Pearcy, 328 Mo. 560, 575, 41 S. W. (2d) 403 (1931); Pear-
son v. Kansas City, 331 Mo. 885, 55 S. W. (2d) 485 (1932); Brown v. Scruggs,
141 Mo. App. 632, 125 S. W. 537 (1910).
142. Van De Vere v. Kansas City, 107 Mo. 83, 17 S. W. 695 (1891).
143. Whitfield v. Carrollton, 50 Mo. App. 98 (1892).
144. Seibert v. Mo. Pac. Ry., 188 Mo. 657, 87 S. W. 995 (1905).
145. Newman v. Marceline, 222 Mo. App. 980, 6 S. W. (2d) 659 (1928).
146. Torpey v. Independence, 24 Mo. App. 288 (1887).
147. State ex rel. Lamm v. Sedalia, 241 S. W. 656 (Mo. Aun. 1922).
148. Roth v. St. Joseph, 164 Mo. App. 26, 147 S. W. 490 (1912).
149. Riggs v. Springfield, 96 S. W. (2d) 392 (Mo. App. 1936).
150. Frick v. Kansas City, 117 Mo. App. 488, 93 S. W. 351 (1906).
151. Dooley v. Kansas City, 82 Mo. 444 (1884) (city authorized to purchase
land outside its limits seized plaintiff's land and used it to keep persons inflicted
with contagious disease); Soulard v. St. Louis, 36 Mo. 546 (1865) (city ap-
propriated private property for street purposes, without following the procedure
prescribed by its charter).
152. Allison v. Richmond, 51 Mo. App. 133 (1892).
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V. STATUTORY REQUIEMENT OF NoncE
A statutory procedural formality, prerequisite to the maintaining of
an action for personal injuries arising from sidewalks, streets, bridges and
boulevards, is the giving of written notice to the mayor of the intention
of the person injured to sue.15 3 The statute requires that the notice be
served within a specified period after the occurrence of the accident, stating
the time, place and "character and circumstances" of the injury suffered.
Recognizing that the primary purposes of the statute are to (1) enable
investigation by the city,"" (2) afford an opportunity for settlement and
thereby avoid perplexing litigation, 5" and (3) protect the city from stale
claims,' the courts have construed the statute liberally 57 so that it would
not defeat its purpose and serve as a "pitfall in the way of honest claim-
ants." 5 8 It has been held that the requirement of furnishing the notice
within the specified period after the accident was waived where the injured
person was, because of his injury, unable to give the notice.'5 9 One serving
notice on the assistant city counselor who accepted it in the name of the
mayor, is considered as having substantially complied with the statutory
requirement.' 0 A failure to accurately specify the time of the accident
is not objectionable.'8 ' Recently, the supreme court held that a mere
general statement of the "character and circumstances" of the injury
would be sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement.5 2
VI. CoNcLUSION
The postulate of state immunity in tort survives by virtue of antiq-
uity alone. It has no place in a society where economical, industrial, tech-
153. Mo. Rav. STAT. (1929) § 7493.
154. Kling v. Kansas City, 227 Mo. App. 1248, 61 S. W. (2d) 411 (1933).
155. Dohring v. Kansas City, 228 Mo. App. 519, 71 S. W. (2d) 170 (1934).
156. Plater v. Kansas City, 334 Mo. 842, 68 S. W. (2d) 800 (1934).
157. Kling v. Kansas City, 227 Mo. App. 1248, 61 S. W. (2d) 411 (1933).
158. Snickles v. St. Joseph, 139 Mo. App. 187, 122 S. W. 1122 (1909).
159. Randolph v. Springfield, 302 Mo. 33, 257 S. W. 449 (1923), apparently
overruling Reid v. Kansas City, 195 Mo. App. 457, 192 S. W. 1047 (1917), where
the court of appeals refused to waive the requirement.
160. Peterson v. Kansas City, 324 Mo. 454, 23 S. W. (2d) 1045 (1930).
161. Boyd v. Kansas City, 291 Mo. 622, 237 S. W. 1001 (1922) (notice
read that accident occurred "on or about" a mentioned day and the accident
actually happened on that date); Kling v. Kansas City, 227 Mo. App. 1248,
61 S. W. (2d) 411 (1933) (variance between notice alleging injury on city
street "about 12:15 P. M." on a named date, and proof that the accident happened
at 12:15 A. M. on the next day, not a fatal variance).
162. David v. St. Louis, 96 S. W. (2d) 353 (Mo. 1936); Comment (1937)
22 WASH. U. L. Q. 447.
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nological and sociological forces have added to the complexity of the
problems with which municipalities must deal. The adherence to the
paradoxical dichotomous nature of a municipality is a vivid example of the
continuing phenomenon of an interplay between legal principles and re-
ality.
If there is a guide which the courts employ in determining whether an
activity performed by the municipality is governmental or proprietary
it must be the one of--she loves me, she loves me not! Certainly there
is no acceptable criterion by which to determine the enigmatic nature of
municipal activity. Nor is its absence difficult to explain. There is no clear
cut differentiation between corporate and governmental functions 18 3 The
city street is an integral part of the state highway; the city sewer is a nec-
essary instrumentality in a system of public sanitation; police protection
and traffic regulation are as necessary within a public park as without,
et cetera. It would be wise to destroy this judicially-manufactured distinc-
tion.osa The responsibility of the community should be co-extensive with
its activity. The legal duty of a municipality to its citizens should be on the
same basis as that of private persons."" Under this conception, the control-
ling criterion would be the existence of a legal duty running to the indi-
vidual.
The judicial submission to the commands of ritual has left the injured
citizen in a sad plight. An action against a negligent official may provide
adequate relief in proceedings to recover specific property, or where the
action of the official may be controlled by mandamus, injunction or other
coercive relief. It is mockery to speak of its availability in an action for
damages where its effectiveness is limited to the pecuniary responsibility
of the officer.
To uphold liability against a municipality will not in any way impede
the effectiveness of municipal activity. Through the power of taxation
the city can spread the cost of municipal negligence among all its inhab-
itants-where it belongs-rather than upon the blameless but injured
163. Note, Inroads upon Municipal Immunity in Tort (1932) 46 HARV. L.
REV. 305.
163a. "There should be greater readiness to abandon an untenable position
when the rule to be discarded may not reasonably be supposed to have determined
the conduct of the litigants, and particularly when in its origin it was the product
of institutions or conditions which have gained a new significance or develop-
ment with the progress of the years." CAlDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JuDIciAL
PRocEss (1921) 151.
164. Borchard, supra note 1, 34 YALE L. J., at 135.
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one. It is unfair to draw an analogy to the immunity in tort of a charita-
ble trust. A diversion of trust funds may seriously affect the operation
of an eleemosynary institution, but the taxing power is a safeguard of the
continued existence of a municipality.
Effective as is the judicial device8 5 of labelling an activity either
governmental or proprietary, its potency is limited by the fact that stare
decisis makes difficult the transfer of a function from one classification to
the other. While the historical anachronism, which gives rise to a distinc-
tion which is synonymous with liability and non-liability, is unsound, un-
just, and obsolete, only one unfamiliar with the vicissitudes of the judi-
cial process will believe that the rule will be expunged by a departure from
the rigidity of the application of the rule of stare decisis. It is regrettable
that the doctrine has led the courts along the path of blind adherence
strewn with ex post facto rationalization. If there is to be an immediate
solution, it must be through legislation,'8 8 designed to admit municipal
responsibility in tort.1 7
165. Butler, J., in Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U. S. 182, 191 (1923): "The
basis of the distinction [between governmental and proprietary functions] is
difficult to state, and there is no established rule for the determination of what
belongs to the one or the other class. It originated with the courts."
166. Seasongood, supra note 1, at 942.
167. "All history demonstrates that legislation intervenes only when a
definite abuse has disclosed itself, through the excess of which public feeling has
finally been aroused." CARDozo, op. cit. supra, note 163a, at 144.
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